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THE WRIGHT ENABLING DISCLOSURE FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS
Karen S. Canady
Abstract: The disclosure in a patent specification must enable others to make and use the
claimed invention. In the competitive biotechnology industry, companies often seek broad
claims to protect contemplated embodiments of their inventions that have not yet been
reduced to practice. In In re Wright, the Federal Circuit recently challenged this approach
when it upheld the rejection, for lack of enablement, of all but the narrowest claims to a
vaccine genetically engineered to protect against retroviruses. This decision unreasonably
elevates the established standard for enablement by limiting biotechnological patent
protection to only those embodiments of a claimed invention whose success can be
demonstrated by working examples. This Note critiques that decision and proposes a limited
policy-based approach to guide consistent determinations of enablement for patent claims.

Dr. Stephen E. Wright used recombinant DNA technology to develop
a vaccine against an RNA virus that causes tumors in chickens. Wright
applied for a patent on his strategy for genetically engineering vaccines
against RNA viruses. His patent application included claims covering
the specific vaccine he had developed, vaccines against other avian
tumor viruses, and vaccines against pathogenic RNA viruses in general,
which include the AIDS and leukemia viruses. The patent examiner
rejected, for lack of enablement, all of Wright's claims except those
limited to the single chicken tumor virus Wright described in his patent
application. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection. This
decision suggests that biotechnology inventors may be limited to very
narrow patent protection.
This Note explores the requirement for enabling disclosure in
biotechnology patents. Part I summarizes the enablement requirement
and discusses problems this requirement raises for biotechnology patents.
In parts II and III, the Note examines In re Wright,' arguing that the court
failed to provide an adequate basis for rejecting Wright's intermediate
claims. Part IV discusses the need for consistency and clarity in
determining enablement for biotechnology patents and proposes a limited
policy-based standard to address this need.

1. 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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PATENTS AND THE ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT

To encourage the development of technology, the federal government
grants patent protection to those who invent products or processes in
exchange for public disclosure of their inventions.2 Patents protect
intellectual property by allowing inventors to exclude others from
making and using their inventions for 17 years from the date the patent
issues.3 During a patent's life, the holder has several options for
exercising this right. The patent holder may: exclude competitors from
marketing the invention, license to one or more others the right to make
or use the invention in exchange for royalty payments, or do nothing
with the invention. Meanwhile, from the time the patent issues, the
public has access to a detailed description of the invention.
For an invention to be patentable, it must be novel, useful, and
nonobvious. 4 The inventor must also satisfy an enablement requirement
by providing a detailed specification 5 of the invention sufficient to enable
those of ordinary skill in the art6 to practice the invention without undue
experimentation, along with a description of the best mode for carrying
out the invention.7 If a disclosure is found to be non-enabling, the
examiner at the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) need not reject the

2. Congress has the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. The patent system is codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988).
5. The specification contains background information, a summary of the invention, and a detailed
description of the process of making and using one or more embodiments of the claimed invention.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure§ 608.01 (1992).
6. "Art" refers to the relevant technology and derives from the clause of the U.S. Constitution
cited supra note 2.
7. The enablement requirement appears in section 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor for carrying out
his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (1988). The best mode requirement raised in the final clause will not be
addressed in this Note. For a discussion of the best mode requirement, see Christopher S. Marchese,
Promoting the Progressof the Useful Arts by Narrowingthe Best Mode DisclosureRequirements in
PatentLaw, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 589 (1993).
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entire patent application, but may reject only those claims8 that are not
enabled by the specification. In determining whether a claim is enabled,
the examiner considers only the state of the art as of the application filing
date and not developments arising during the pendency of the
application.' Thus, the applicant is not required to anticipate future
developments when drafting the specification. When rejecting a claim
for non-enablement, the examiner bears the initial burden of providing a
reasonable explanation for doubting the adequacy of the disclosure. 0
Once this burden has been met by the examiner, the burden shifts to the
applicant, who may provide evidence that the disclosure does in fact
enable the invention as claimed."l
The extent of disclosure necessary to satisfy the enablement
requirement varies with the art, and is determined by consideration of
several identified factors. 2
The application of these factors to
biotechnology raises concerns about balancing the need to adequately
reward inventors for their disclosures against the need to encourage other
inventors to bring subsequent technological advances into the public
domain.
A.

Ease of Compliance with the EnablementRequirement Varies with
the Technology

Satisfying the enablement requirement is relatively straightforward for
some technologies. For example, the specification for the invention of
chopsticks would contain a description of two sticks of a given range of
sizes, how sticks of appropriate dimensions could be made, and how the
sticks would be positioned in the hand to be used for eating. Even if the
claims were broad enough to include chopsticks with pointed and
rounded tips, as well as other possible combinations of features, the
above specification would be sufficiently enabling for the ordinary
utensil manufacturer to produce the invention as claimed.
The
specifications for complex machinery can be similarly straightforward

8. A patent application consists of claims and a specification. The claims define the scope of the
patent protection sought, while the specification describes the claimed invention. Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure,supranote 5, § 608.01.
9. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1977),followed in Hormone Research Found., Inc.
v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed,499 U.S. 955 (1991).
10. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223-24 (C.C.P.A. 1971),followed in Weil v. Fritz, 601 F.2d
551, 555 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
11. Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 223-24.
12. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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because of the mechanical nature of the technology, which makes use of
well-understood scientific principles.
With chemical and biological inventions, however, satisfying the
enablement requirement is often more challenging. For example, an
inventor may produce a potion to make hair grow on the scalp by
culturing cells that secrete a hormone which, when combined with a
particular oil-based medium, promotes hair growth. The patent claim
may be broad enough to include combining the cellular secretions with
any oil-based medium. If the ordinary manufacturer of hair potions
would have to experiment extensively with each of a large number of oilbased media in order to determine which would be suitable vehicles for
use of the hormone, then the enablement requirement is not satisfied.
Alternatively, if the manufacturer need use cnly routine testing
procedures to screen a number of oil-based media, then the applicant has
satisfied the enablement requirement.
Biotechnology companies 3 often encounter frustration when trying to
satisfy the enablement requirement. This frustration arises when an
inventor develops a strategy for solving a class of problems, but has yet
to demonstrate success in all applications within that class. Although the
strategy may seem logical enough that one would expect it to succeed
wherever applied, the unpredictability of biology raises doubts about this
expectation. Difficulties arise because trial and error is normally
required before a biologist can know which applications of a given
strategy will succeed. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between claimed
inventions that solve an entire class of problems and those whose
applicability is more limited.
B.

SeveralFactorsDetermine Satisfaction of the Enablement
Requirement

When evaluating satisfaction of the enablement requirement, the
examiner's objective is to determine whether one of ordinary skill in the
art could practice the invention without engaging in undue
experimentation." The question is whether one of ordinary skill in the
art would have a reasonable expectation of success when setting out to
practice the claimed invention by following the description in the patent
13. Although inventors may seek patent protection and encounter the same frustrations,
biotechnology companies are most often in this position because inventors typically assign their
patent rights to their employers.
14. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
see also Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
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specification. The examiner applies a standard of reasonableness to the
consideration of undue experimentation, taking into account the nature of
the invention and the state of the art. 5
The PTO and the courts consider eight factors when determining
whether the experimentation required to practice an invention according
to the specification is unduly extensive. The factors, as identified in Ex
parteForman,16 are: the breadth of the claims, the unpredictability of the
art, the amount of experimentation necessary, the extent of guidance
presented, the presence of working examples, the nature of the invention,
the state of the prior art, and the relative skill of those in that art. Claim
breadth and unpredictability of the art serve as threshold factors. The
remaining factors are often considered in combination, such that the
presence of one may obviate the need to consider others.
1.

Unpredictabilityof the Art and Breadth of Claims Serve as
ThresholdFactors

The court (or PTO) will not consider the other Forman factors unless
the claims are broad and the art is unpredictable. 7 If the claims are
narrow enough to encompass only the examples described in the
specification, the examiner will presume compliance with the enablement
requirement. 8 Furthermore, if the art is predictable, 9 all of the other
factors are much less relevant. Those who will practice the invention
will avoid a large amount of experimentation because the predictability
of the technology will guide them. The ability to predict the outcome
reduces the need for guidance, additional examples, and a high level of
skill. If the art has reached a state of predictability, then the state of the
art is sufficiently advanced, and the nature of the invention will be less

15. Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018
(1972).
16. 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 547 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int., 1986); Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (adopting
the factors identified in Forman).
17. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (acknowledging in dicta that
unpredictability of the art can be enough to create a reasonable doubt regarding enablement).
18. Id.
19. Courts and commentators have suggested that entire arts should not be categorized as
predictable or unpredictable when the better course would be to evaluate the predictability of the
process or element at issue. In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 734 (C.C.P.A. 1971). See also Ellen P.
winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts-Biotechnology,70 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y
608, 609 (1988). This Note uses "art" to refer to classes of inventions and not the entire field of
biotechnology.
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problematic. Thus, the Fornan factors-based analysis of enablement
primarily arises in the less predictable chemical and biological arts.2"
2.

The Forman Factorsare Often Applied in Combination

All of the undue experimentation factors need not be reviewed in each
case. z" Individual cases often address two or three of the Forman factors
in combination. For example, the quantity of experimentation can be
If the required
offset by the nature of the experimentation.
experimentation is routine, a large amount is permissible. The Federal
Circuit recognized this offset principle in In ro Wands.'
Wands
concerned a patent for the production of monoclonal antibodies' to
detect hepatitis B surface antigen. In order to practice this invention as
broadly as it was claimed, a person skilled in the art would have to
screen as many as 134 hybridomas z4 While the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences considered this amount of experimentation undue, the
Federal Circuit disagreed, pointing out that it is the nature of monoclonal
antibody work to screen a number of hybridomas to find one producing a
desired antibody." Thus, the Wands court considered one of the Forman
factors, the nature of monoclonal antibody technology, in determining
whether a second factor, quantity of experiments, was indicative of
undue experimentation.
Similarly, the courts have considered other Forman undue
experimentation factors in combination. For example, In re Vaeck26 held
20. Donald S. Chisum, Intellectual PropertyLaw: United States § 2D[3][a] (1992); In re Wands,
858 F.2d 731, 736-40 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (applying Forman factors to biological invention); Exparte
Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 548 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int., 1986) (noting that "experiments in
genetic engineering produce, at best, unpredictable results"); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting, with reference to chemical and biological ats, "the scope of enablement
obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability").
21. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir.) (noting that
it is not necessary for the court to review all the factors as they are "illustrative, not mandatory"),
cert.denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
22. 858 F.2d at 737.
23. Monoclonal antibodies bind to single antigenic sites or epitopes, distinguishing them from
polyclonal antisera, which are far less specific because they contain numerous antibodies
recognizing a variety of antigenic sites.
24. A hybridoma results from the fusion of an antibody-producing lymphocyte with an immortal
myeloma cell. The resulting hybrid cll will produce the same antibady the lymphocyte produced
and will perpetually divide and survive in vitro. Following fusion, the hybridomas are screened to
determine the characteristics of the antibodies produced.
25. Wands, 858 F.2d at 740.
26. 947 F.2d 488,496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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that, where the claims are broad enough to cover species not described in
the specification, then illustrative examples and guidance in selecting
useful species are required. In so holding, Vaeck cited the relatively
undeveloped state of the art regarding the biology of the genera of
bacteria involved and the limited guidance provided in the
specification.27
C.

ProblemsRaisedby Biotechnology Patents

Patenting biotechnological inventions raises two difficulties that are
not encountered in more established fields. First, the biotechnology
patent applicant struggles with the conflicting demands of the
nonobviousness and enablement requirements with respect to the
predictability of the art. Second, because the technology is developing
rapidly, the patent applicant seeks claims broad enough to cover
modifications of the invention enabled by future technical advances.28
Without assurance that developments in the near future will not render a
patent worthless, companies will not invest in the research and
development necessary to bring a product to market.29 The need for
broad protection, however, must be weighed against policy
considerations favoring limited claim scope.
1.

The Nonobviousness and Enablement Requirements Present
Conflicting Demands

The applicant for a biotechnological patent faces the difficulty of
characterizing the field of the invention as unpredictable for purposes of
meeting the nonobviousness requirement and as predictable for satisfying
the enablement requirement. In order to be patentable, the invention
must be nonobvious. Because biotechnology inventions are often
recombinant versions of known proteins, it is the unpredictable aspects
of applying recombinant DNA technology that make these inventions
nonobvious and patentable." On the other hand, if the art is considered
unpredictable, claims covering modifications of the examples provided
are difficult to enable. This tension is especially prevalent in the fields of
27. Id. at 495.
28. Discussed in Winner, supra note 19, at 615.
29. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
InternationalAnalysis383 (1984).

Commercial Biotechnology: An

30. Kate H. Murashige, Section 102/103 Issues in Biotechnology PatentProsecution, 16 AIPLA

Q.J 294,297-98 (1988-89).
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recombinant DNA and monoclonal antibodies, where the general
strategies are well-established, but application of these strategies to new
proteins often requires some modification of previous methods.31
2.

The Needfor Broad Claims Conflicts with Policy Considerations
FavoringLimited Protection

Case law concerning biotechnology patents reflects the tension
between the need for broad claims to meaningfully reward valuable
(often medically significant) advances and the concern that granting
broad claims will hinder further advances or disproportionately reward
those who make small, but timely, contributions. Economically viable
biotechnology patents must be broad enough in scope to prevent
competitors from being able to invent around the patent.32 If the claims
are too narrow, competitors can use materials or methods not covered by
the claims to achieve essentially the same result without infringing the
patent. This is more likely to occur in rapidly developing fields, such as
biotechnology, where developments not anticipated by a patent
application often arise shortly after the patent is filed.
Biotechnology, however, is characterized by what Professors Robert
Merges and Richard Nelson33 call science-based technical advances.
These are advances which build on recent scientific developments that
reveal technological opportunities for industry.34 Merges and Nelson
have identified three situations in which science-based inventions should
be limited to narrower claims because much of the background
contribution comes from basic science research. First, narrower claims
may be justified where many are working toward the same objective, and
only the first to achieve that objective will get the patent. A second
situation warranting narrow protection is one in which a new
development has been anticipated, and the first to make it operational has
made a relatively small contribution.
Third, narrow claims are
appropriate when the invention is a great commercial success, but is
merely a successful practical application of principles generally known
by scientists.35
31. Id. at 297-300.
32. Thomas G. Wiseman, Biotechnology Patent Practice-A Primer, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 394, 402
(1989); CommercialBiotechnology: An InternationalAnalysis, supranc.te 29, at 388-90.
33. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 839, 883 (1990).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 884.
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The litigation concerning human growth hormone (hGH) exemplifies
the tension between the need for broad claims and the concern over
disproportionately rewarding contributions of limited value. In Hormone
Research Foundation v. Genentech,3 6 the dispute concerned Hormone
Research Foundation's (HRF's) patent on synthetic hGH.37 HRF sued
Genentech for infringement of its patent because Genentech was
producing hGH by a recombinant DNA technique. HRF's patent did not
anticipate the ability to produce hGH by recombinant DNA methods, but
it covered the same product. At the time the HRF patent application was
filed, the inventor erroneously indicated in the application that he had
identified the structure of natural hGH. HRF's hGH consisted of a 190
amino acid sequence, while Genentech's hGH contained 192 amino
acids. Genentech defended the alleged infringement by asserting that its
product did not have the same structure as that claimed in the HRF
patent. The district court granted Genentech's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that 1) its products did not infringe the lIRF
patent, and 2) HRF's claims were invalid for nonenablement. The
Federal Circuit agreed that Genentech had not literally infringed the HRF
patent, but remanded the case for determination of factual issues
concerning the judgment of noninfringement and invalidity.3 8
This case raises questions of who deserves broad protection for their
contribution of useful biotechnology. Before HRF developed the
synthetic production of hGH, this hormone could be obtained only by
extraction from the pituitary glands of human cadavers.39 HRF's
contribution of synthetic hGH was, therefore, a valuable breakthrough
for the treatment of dwarfism and other growth hormone deficiencies.
HRF did not, however, anticipate the later developments of recombinant
DNA technology. As the Federal Circuit noted, the production of purer
and more potent forms of the compound through the use of laterdeveloped technology does not necessarily indicate that the original
patent specification did not enable the production of the purer forms.4"
One could argue that the original inventor should not be punished for a
few inaccuracies in the sequence in favor of one who makes a small,
albeit significant, improvement on his method, and who escapes
36. 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed,499 U.S. 955 (1991).
37. If the amino acid sequence for a given protein is known, that protein can be synthesized
chemically by assembling the necessary amino acids in the proper sequence. This was how HRF
was making hGH at the time the patent was filed. Id. at 1560.
38. Id.at 1569.
39. Id. at 1560n.1.
40. Id. at 1568.
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infringement by the good fortune of the original inventor's minor error.
On the other hand, the development of a more potent hGH should not be
hindered by an overly broad patent issued to the first to invent synthetic
hGH, especially when the original patent disclosed an erroneous amino
acid sequence.
In re Wright reflects this tension between conflicting policy
considerations in patent law. One concern is that those who disclose
their inventions to the public deserve patent protection broad enough to
make disclosure worthwhile.4"
A contrary concern is that patent
protection, especially in science-based disciplines like biotechnology,
should be conservative in scope so as to encourage others to continue
research and development without fear of infringing existing patents.4 2
Wright developed a vaccine strategy clearly worthy of patent protection.
The question is what scope of patent protection appropriately rewards
this type of moderately significant invention without hindering
development of vaccines needed to protect against other RNA viruses.
II.

INRE WRIGHT

Dr. Stephen E. Wright used recombinant DNA techniques to develop
a vaccine against an avian RNA tumor virus and applied for patent
protection covering the use of his strategy to make vaccines against RNA
viruses.43 Wright's application included broad, intermediate, and narrow
claims. The broad claims covered vaccines against RNA viruses in
general.' The intermediate claims were limited to vaccines against avian
RNA tumor viruses. The only claims the PTO allowed were his
narrowest, those limited to the one vaccine he had demonstrated as
successful against one avian RNA tumor virus.

41. Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 Yale L.J. 777,
791-92 (1992).
42. Id. at 793-94.
43. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
44. RNA viruses include a wide variety of virus classes, all of which use RNA (rather than DNA)
for their genetic material. Retroviruses are one class of RNA virus so named for their ability to use
an enzyme (reverse transcriptase) to make DNA from their RNA. RNA tumor viruses are
retroviruses that cause tumors. Not all retroviruses are tumor viruses (for example, the AIDS and
leukemia viruses). See generally RNA Tumor Viruses (Robin Weiss et al. eds., 1982).
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A.

RecombinantDNA Technology

Recombinant DNA technology involves engineering the production of
proteins or cells with particular functions by taking advantage of the
means by which living organisms naturally produce proteins. The
strategy is to put the DNA coding for a desired protein into a host cell by
a process known as transformation or transfection. Transfected host cells
can serve as factories to produce large quantities of the protein. This
approach has been used to produce human insulin and human growth
hormone, both of which were previously obtainable only by extraction
from cadavers.45 Alternatively, the objective may be to engineer a cell
with a particular combination of properties by changing the proteins
synthesized within the cell.
One general approach can be outlined as follows.46 First, the
researcher isolates the DNA encoding the desired protein. Then this
DNA is linked to the DNA of a bacterium or virus capable of infecting
the host cell.47 The foreign DNA integrates into the host cell genome,
and the transfected cells then carry and express48 the foreign gene. By
selecting genes that code for useful features, and omitting genes that
code for unwanted characteristics, one can construct a cell ideally suited
for a particular purpose. One example is a live vaccine containing the
viral particles necessary to protect against disease, but lacking the
pathogenic gene regions responsible for the risks of exposure to a natural
virus.
B.

Wright's Invention

Using recombinant DNA techniques, Wright developed a vaccine
effective at immunizing chickens against a tumor virus, Prague avian
sarcoma virus (PrASV).49 His strategy involved two major steps. First,
he isolated the gene that codes for envelope A protein, a PrASV

45. Walter L. Miller, Use of Recombinant DNA Technology for the Production of Polypeptides,
118 Advances in Experimental Med. & Biology 153, 168-69 (1979).
46. For a more detailed explanation of recombinant DNA techniques, see James D. Watson et al.,
RecombinantDNA: A Short Course (1983).
47. Restriction enzymes, which cut DNA at sites containing specific nucleic acid sequences, are
used to cut out desired pieces of DNA. Other enzymes (DNA ligase) are used to splice two segments
of DNA.
48. When a cell makes the protein coded for by a particular gene, the gene is said to be expressed.
49. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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antigen." He then transfected chicken embryo cell-s with the antigenic
genes, and infected the cells with a similar but nononcogenic5 virus, 0type Rous Associated Virus (RAV-0). The cells were then incubated to
allow time for the genetic material of the RAV-0 to recombine with the
envelope gene, and for the recombined virus to replicate. Wright
subsequently purified the vaccine so that it contained only the desired
recombinant virus particles. In this manner, he created a version of the
virus, called RAV-Ac n , that lacked the ability to indtce tumor formation
but provoked an immune response to PrASV.
C.

The Rejection of Wright's Claims

The PTO examiner allowed only the claims speci:fic to the RAV-Acn
vaccine and the process for making RAV-Ac n or a similar viral vaccine
containing the same antigenic gene and non-oncogenic virus. 2 The
examiner rejected the broader claims covering vaccines, or the process
for making vaccines, for other pathogenic RNA viruses by creating a
genome coding for antigenicity without pathogenicity.53 She also

50. An antigen is a protein that stimulates an immune response. Antibodies generated as part of
the immune response recognize and bind to antigens on the foreign material, in this case, the tumor
virus. Antigen recognition is the means by which the immune system knows which cells to destroy.
51. Oncogenicity refers to the ability to induce tumor formation.
52. The allowed claims were:
Claim 13 A live, non-pathogenic vaccine for a pathogenic RNA virus, comprising an
immunologically effective amount of a viral, antigenic, genomic expression having an antigenic
determinant region of the RNA virus, but no pathogenic properties, the viral, antigenic, genomic
expression being the RAV-Acn virus.
Claim 14 A vaccine according to claim 13, wherein the vaccine has teen purified by selection
for the expression of the antigenic genome.
Claim 43 A process for producing a live, non-pathogenic, recombinant vaccine conferring
immunity against the PrASV avian tumor virus in chickens, comprising, inserting the PrASV env
A gene into a RAV-O virus by marker rescue such that said PrASV env A gene replaces the
endogenous envelope gene of the RAV-O virus; and selecting for the recombinant in C/E cells.
Claim 44 A live, non-pathogenic, recombinant vaccine conferring immunity against the PrASV
avian tumor virus in chickens, in which vaccine the PrASV env A gene has been inserted into a
RAV-O virus by marker rescue to replace the endogenous envelope gene of the RAV-O virus,
and the recombinant has been selected for in C/E cells.
Wright, 999 F.2d at 1559.
53. Two of the rejected claims were:
Claim 1 A process for producing a live non-pathogenic vaccine for a pathogenic RNA virus,
comprising the steps of identifying the antigenic and pathogenic gene regions of said virus;
performing gene alteration to produce a genome which codes for the antigenicity of the virus,
but does not have its pathogenicity; and obtaining an expression of the gene.
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rejected intermediate claims limited to vaccines against avian tumor
viruses.
Wright's single success, the examiner argued, did not
demonstrate sufficient probability that other recombinant RNA viruses
could be made without undue experimentation. 4
The examiner considered Wright's most generic claims too broad
because many of them could include any and all live, non-pathogenic
vaccines, and processes for making these vaccines, which would protect
any living organism from any RNA virus." She recognized that these
claims were broad enough to include vaccines against leukemia viruses,
tumor viruses, and AIDS viruses.56 The examiner pointed out that
scientists have been unable to develop an AIDS vaccine for humans
despite the considerable amount of time and money devoted to that
effort.57
Referring to a 1988 article concerning AIDS vaccine
development," the examiner noted the diversity of AIDS virus genes in
general and of their envelope proteins in particular. 9 Wright's claims
were too broad because they required extrapolation of one virus envelope
gene's immunogenicity to that of another virus envelope gene. Such an
extrapolation has not been possible between divergent immunodeficiency
viruses.6 0
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the
examiner's rejection.6' The board agreed with the examiner that the
rejected claims lacked enabling disclosure because of their breadth and
the lack of evidence supporting an expectation of success in producing
an effective vaccine using the claimed process.62 The board also noted
that the examiner allowed the narrowest claims only after Wright

Claim 11 A live, non-pathogenic vaccine for a pathogenic RNA virus, comprising an
immunologically effective amount of a viral antigenic, genomic expression having an antigenic
determinant region of the RNA virus, but no pathogenic properties.
Id. at 1559-60.
54. Id. at 1560.
55. Id.
56. Id. Human immunodeficiency virus (ff) is an RNA virus thought to play a causative role in
AIDS. Wright's broader claims would encompass any pathogenic RNA virus, including HIV.
57. Id.
58. Thomas J. Matthews et at., Prospectsfor Development of a Vaccine Against HIV in Human
Retroviruses, Cancer,and AIDS: Approaches to Prevention and Therapy 313 (Dani Bolognesi ed.,
1988).
59. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1560.
60. Id; see also Matthews, supra note 58, at 317.
61. Wright, 999 F.2dat 1561.
62. 1d. at 1560.
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submitted evidence of the vaccine's efficacy in vivo. '53 Although Wright
had shown that his strategy was successful in constructing a recombinant
virus with the desired characteristics and that this vires could provoke an
immune response, the examiner did not consider the invention enabled
until Wright submitted evidence of immunoprotection in chickens.'
The Federal Circuit affirmed, essentially by citing the examiner's
answer." The court noted the inclusion of AIDS vaccines within the
claims to demonstrate the unpredictability of the art as well as the
breadth of the claims. 6 The court approved of the examiner's reliance
upon a 1988 article 67 in support of her position that, as of February
1983,6" the physiological activity of RNA viruses was so unpredictable
that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a reasonable
expectation that any living organism could be immunized against any
pathogenic RNA virus by inoculation with a live virus containing the
antigenic portion, but not the pathogenic portion, of the RNA virus.
Wright argued that the art is not so unpredictable that his specification
was not enabling.69 Wright supported this argument with his subsequent
success in constructing a recombinant vaccine using a different envelope
gene and following his disclosed invention.7" He also cited papers
published by others in 1990-92 showing successftl application of his
strategy to construct vaccines effective at protecting chimpanzees and
goats from immunodeficiency viruses. 71 The court disregarded these
successes because they addressed the current state of the art rather than
the state of the art in February of 1983.72 In dicta, the court also noted
that these few successes were not sufficient to rebut the examiner's
determination of undue experimentation.73
63. In vivo refers to in the living organism.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Wright,999 F.2d at 1561.
Id. at 1562-63.
Id. at 1562.
Matthews, supra note 58.

68. Wright filed his patent application on February 25, 1983. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1558, n.1.
69. Id. at 1562.
70. Id.
71. Id. n.7.
72. Id. at 1562-63.
73. Id. at 1563. Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on this point and it remains unclear
what would have been sufficient. For example, the dicta imply that if these successful examples had
been included in the original specification, the court still might have considered them insufficient to
support claims beyond those limited to the RAV-Acn vaccine. Yet, it is difficult to see how working
examples could be insufficient to enable the corresponding claims. The burden would be on the
examiner to show why the examples would not be enabling.
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III. ANALYSIS OF WRIGHT
Although the court reached an appropriate result with respect to
Wright's broadest claims, it improperly considered post-filing-date
evidence to support its finding of non-enablement. With respect to
Wright's claims limited to avian tumor virus vaccines, the PTO failed to
meet its burden of providing a reasonable basis for concluding that these
intermediate claims were not enabled. The Federal Circuit emphasized
the breadth of Wright's most generic claims in affirming the examiner's
finding of non-enablement, while relying on faulty reasoning to support
its finding that Wright had not enabled the claims limited to what the
court recognized as a narrow group.74 The frequent reference to the
inclusion of AIDS vaccines suggests a concern with reserving broad
patent protection for those whose inventions bring a significant
breakthrough.
This policy consideration justifies the rejection of
Wright's broader claims, but it does not adequately support the rejection
of his intermediate claims. By suggesting that Wright needed working
examples to enable all embodiments of his claimed invention, the court
elevated the enablement standard and set a confusing precedent.
A.

The CourtImproperly ConsideredPost-Filing-DateEvidence

The court erroneously upheld the examiner's reliance on post-filingdate developments to demonstrate the unpredictability of the art.75 While
later publications may be used as evidence of the state of the art existing
on the filing date,76 the Wright court stretches this to include using the
later state of the art as evidence of the state of the art on the filing date.
This is not the same as citing a post-filing date publication that refers to
the state of the art as of the filing date. The examiner used the late date
74. Id. at 1564.
75. This was done even though the court refused to permit the applicant to cite developments
occurring after the filing date to support the predictability of the art and the enablement provided in
the disclosure. Yet the court explicitly stated in Hogan that "Courts should not treat the same legal
question, enablement under § 112, in one manner with respect to the applicant and in a different
manner with respect to the examiner." In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604-05 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding
that enablement must be determined as of the filing date, and not on the basis of evidence arising
later). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals suggested in Marzocchi, however, that references
supporting the accuracy of the disclosure as enabling need not necessarily pre-date the filing. In re
Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1971). This dictum suggests that Wright should have
been permitted to offer his 1985 data to demonstrate the enablement provided by his patent
specification, provided that these data were developed through application of the 1983 state of the
art.
76. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605.
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of the Matthews publication as evidence that the art of producing
vaccines for retroviruses was still unpredictable five years after the filing
date of Wright's application.77 The Federal Circuit agreed that the 1988
article illustrates that "the art is not even today as predictable as Wright
has suggested that it was back in 1983.""78 This statement reflects the
erroneous assumption that an art becomes more predictable with time. It
is true that developments occurring after the filing.date can make the art
more predictable as the properties of a biological system become better
understood.79 In some fields, however, new discoveries and difficulties
advancing the art can reveal that the biological system is highly variable
and less predictable than was once believed. This is true with the race to
develop an effective AIDS vaccine."0 The Wright court erred when it
presumed that, because immunodeficiency viruses were known to be
highly variable in 1988, it must have been known in 1983 that RNA
viruses were so unpredictable that a vaccine strategy effective against
one would not be expected to work with another. The 1988 article on
AIDS viruses, however, does not describe the state of the art existing in
1983. The first publications suggesting that AIDS could be caused by a
retrovirus were not even published until May 1983, three months after
Wright filed his patent application.8
Reference to the unpredictability of an elemeni unknown as of the
filing date does not offer a reasonable basis for claim rejection on
grounds of nonenablement. In re Hogan drew a distinction between
permissible and impermissible uses of a later publication to demonstrate
non-enablement 2 It is permissible to use a later publication as evidence
77. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1560.
78. Id. at 1563.
79. Murashige, supranote 30, at 299-300 (implying that, in the mon~clonal antibody field, the art
has become so predictable that it is difficult to patent new inventions).
80. Peter Newmark, Receding Hopes of AIDS Vaccines, 333 Nature 699 (1988) (noting difficulty
in developing AIDS vaccine, more than for any other virus, and listing numerous reasons for this
difficulty, one of which is genomic variability); George M. Shaw et al., Molecular Characterization
of Human T-Cell Leukemia (Lymphotropic) Virus Type III in the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome, 226 Science 1165, 1167-68 (1984) (contrasting novel data on genomic diversity of AIDS
virus with genomic conservation of related viruses).
81. M. Essex et al., Antibodies to Cell Membrane Antigens Associated with Human T-Cell
Leukemia Virus in Patientswith AIDS, 220 Science 859 (May 20, 1983); Edward P. Gelmann et al.,
ProviralDNA of a Retrovirus, Human T-Cell Leukemia Virus, in Two Patients with AIDS, 220
Science 862 (May 20, 1983); Robert C. Gallo et al., Isolation of Hun'man T-Cell Leukemia Virus in
AcquiredImmune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 220 Science 867 (May 20, 1983); F. Barr-Sinoussi
et al., Isolation of a T-Lymphotropic Retrovirus from a Patient ai Risk for Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 220 Science 868 (May 20, 1983).
82. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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that, as of the filing date, the invention could not be practiced as claimed
But using a later publication to
without undue experimentation.
demonstrate art-related facts that did not exist on the filing date is
impermissible.83 In Hogan, a claim covering amorphous polymers was
rejected because the use of amorphous polymers was not enabled by the
specification. Amorphous polymers, however, were not discovered until
nine years after Hogan's application filing date. In reversing the claim
rejection, the court pointed out that "[t]o now say that appellants should
have disclosed in 1953 the amorphous form which on this record did not
exist until 1962, would be to impose an impossible burden on inventors
and thus on the patent system."84 Likewise, it would have placed an
impossible burden on Wright to have required him to enable the
application of his claimed vaccine strategy to an unusually variable class
of retroviruses before that class of viruses had been discovered."
B.

The Court'sRejection of the Intermediate Claims was Based on
FaultyReasoningand Elevated the Enablement Standard

The Wright opinion focused heavily on the broadest claims, which
covered recombinant vaccines protecting against any RNA virus.86 The
court gave less attention to the intermediate claims, also rejected for nonenablement, which were restricted to vaccines against avian tumor
viruses. In Wright, the court illogically equated variability between
breeds of chickens with variability among viruses to support rejection of
the intermediate claims. This was not a reasonable basis for claim
rejection and, if taken literally, elevates the standard for enablement such
that Wright's narrowest claims should have been rejected as well.
1.

The Court'sRejection of the IntermediateClaims was Based on
FaultyReasoning

The court drew support for its assertion of unpredictability in the art
of avian RNA tumor viruses from a 1985 paper co-authored by Wright.87
83. Id.
84. Id. at 606.
85. It would have been appropriate, however, to use publications demonstrating the variability
among the many types of RNA viruses known at the time of Wright's filing date.
86. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
87. The unpublished paper, Avian Retroviral Recombinant Expressing Foreign Envelope Delays
Tumor FormationofASV-A-Induced Sarcoma,was co-authored by David Bennett, and was attached
to a November 1985 declaration by Wright. Id. at 1564.
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This paper stated that one breed of chickens did not respond well
immunologically and that future experiments would include other breeds
of chickens. According to the court, this "suggests that, even as late as
1985, the genetic diversity existing among chickens alone required
efficacy testing even among the members of this narrow group."88 The
court illogically used this evidence of variability between different
breeds of chickens as evidence of variability among avian RNA viruses.89
In fact, in 1983, RNA tumor viruses were considered so genetically
similar that the preface of a large compendium on the subject indicated
that most of its material could be considered generally applicable to all
R.NA tumor viruses.9" The introductory chapter of this compendium
pointed out the remarkable uniformity of RNA tunor virus genomes
despite the diversity of their pathological mechanisms. 9' Wright's
intermediate claims were limited to avian RNA tumor viruses, the subset
of RNA tumor viruses that has been studied since 1911.92 It is not clear,
therefore, why the court considered the narrow class of avian RNA tumor
viruses to have the same problems of unpredictability as all classes of
RNA viruses.
If the court was asserting that there was so much variability among
avian tumor viruses that a vaccine strategy effective against one virus
could not be expected to be effective against another, then the court
should have supported its statement with evidence directly related to this
assertion. Instead, the court discussed only variability between chicken
breeds. The fact that one breed of chickens is less responsive to a
vaccine against a single virus does not mean that there is so much
variability among avian viruses that the strategy used to make the
vaccine against one virus would not be effective against other viruses of
the same type.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the court's reasoning suggests that
even Wright's narrowest claims should have been rejected. In particular,
claim 43 specifically covers a process for producing a "vaccine
conferring immunity against the PrASV avian tumor virus in chickens." 93
88. Id.
89. The court concluded: "Accordingly, we see no error in the Board's finding that one skilled in
the art would not have believed as early as February of 1983 that tLe success of Wright's one
example could be extrapolated with a reasonable expectation of success to all avian RNA viruses."
Id.
90. RNTA Tumor Viruses, supranote 44, at viii.
91. Id. at 2-3.
92. Id. at 3.
93. See supranote 52.
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If the court believed that the genetic diversity among chickens requires
efficacy testing for all breeds of this narrow group, then claim 43 should
have been rejected as non-enabled. To enable claim 43 in accordance
with the Federal Circuit's reasoning, Wright would have had to submit
evidence that his recombinant PrASV vaccine provokes an effective
immune response in all breeds of chickens. This would be inconsistent
with existing precedent94 and would place an unfair burden on patent
applicants.
2.

The Court Elevated the EnablementStandard

The court was not persuaded by Wright's argument that the scientific
literature indicated predictability in the area of avian RNA tumor viruses.
Instead, the court cited Wright's declaration, in which he stated that he
waited for results of in vivo tests before applying for the patent. The
court used this declaration as evidence that in vivo testing is necessary to
enable the application of Wright's invention to other avian viruses,
without citing other evidence that in vivo testing was required. Thus, the
court implied that an applicant should refrain from providing too much
data supporting enablement, lest that amount of data be required for other
embodiments of the invention.
By suggesting that Wright needed to perform in vivo efficacy tests for
each vaccine and each animal species covered by his claims, the court set
an extraordinarily high standard for biotechnological inventions and
contradicted well-established precedents. 95
Essentially, the court
elevated the standard for an enabling disclosure from a reasonable
expectation of success to a demonstrated success. Wright could be
interpreted as holding that the specification must enable one of ordinary
skill in the art to practice the invention without any experimentation,
rather than without undue experimentation.
If so, then a patent

94. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("It is well settled that patent applicants are
not required to disclose every species encompassed by their claims, even in an unpredictable art.');
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (specification enabled claim to methods using a
generic class of antibodies even though applicant deposited only one hybridoma cell line that
secreted a specific antibody); United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 786 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(specification disclosing a method of electrically stimulating fractured bone with stainless steel
electrodes to promote healing was enabling for the use of other electrode materials not described in
the specification), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1046 (1989); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (patent specification was enabling where it listed
elements that could form thousands of products, not all of which would be operative, and holding
that the use of prophetic examples does not necessarily make a specification non-enabling).
95. See cases cited supranote 94.
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specification would have to provide evidence that each embodiment of a
claimed invention will succeed.
C.

Implicit Policy ConsiderationsInfluenced Wright

As acknowledged in Hogan, enablement questions ultimately reflect
the concern that the scope of patent protection should match the
applicant's contribution to the art.96 In light of this policy, it is
reasonable that Wright's broadest claims were rejected. Wright's
contribution of a vaccine protecting chickens against a tumor virus does
not warrant patent protection for vaccines against all of the many other
types of RNA viruses. This concern does not provide an adequate basis,
however, for denying him patent protection for vaccines against other
avian RNA tumor viruses.
The court's restriction of Wright's patent to exclude the broadest
claims is consistent with Merges and Nelson's scheme for inventions
relying heavily on basic science.97 Scientists have been searching for
effective vaccines against RNA viruses for some lime, with the effort
significantly enhanced by recombinant DNA technology.98 A 1980
publication discusses the general strategy of using recombinant DNA
technology to construct other types of viral vaccines bearing the
antigenic sites while lacking the pathogenic properies.9 9 While Wright
may have been the first to develop a specific and effective retroviral
vaccine, many others have been working on the sare problem and could
be close to finding a more effective vaccine strategy for protection
against AIDS. When so many scientists must spend years of effort
gradually working toward a solution to a problem as great as the spread
of AIDS, it is unreasonable to grant broad patent protection to the first to
develop one vaccine effective at protecting chickens from a tumor virus.
The court expressed its concern with disproportionately rewarding
Wright's contribution when it suggested that, if Wright's viral vaccine
strategy enabled his broader claims, then an effective AIDS vaccine
would have been developed by the time this case was decided. The court
showed little faith that Wright's invention could improve the prospects
for developing an effective AIDS vaccine, despite Wright's attempt to
96. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605-06 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
97. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
98. B.P. Marmion, Prospectsfor New Viral Vaccines, 290 Phil. Transactions of the Royal Soc'y
of London-Biology 395 (1980).
99. Id.
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demonstrate that his invention had already been successful in making
effective recombinant AIDS vaccines for chimpanzees and goats. 00
These developments were dismissed because they occurred after the
filing date.'0 ' While claims broad enough to include all RNA viruses, or
even all retroviruses, would disproportionately reward Wright for his
invention, it is not clear that this same policy argument can be applied to
the claims limited to avian RNA tumor viruses. The Merges and Nelson
arguments for narrow patent scope justify rejecting claims covering an
entire field (for example, all retroviruses), but do not require restricting
patent protection to those embodiments actually reduced to practice.
Avian RNA tumor viruses are a relatively restricted and homogeneous
class of viruses, and a patent claim limited to this class would present an
appropriate middle ground between disproportionately broad protection
and an overly narrow patent.
D.

Wright CreatesProblemsfor Inventors and Sets a Confusing
Precedent

As a result of Wright, biotechnology companies may be reluctant to
disclose their inventions through patents because they would risk public
disclosure of their trade secrets without receiving adequate protection to
support their investment in research and development.
Simply
postponing patent filing until more working examples have been
developed would cause two problems for such companies. First, the
applicant would risk losing patent rights in foreign countries that grant
patents with priority to those who file first,0 2 and require filing within a
year of filing in the United States.0 3 Second, the state of the art may
advance so much that the invention is no longer patentable because it has
become obvious. Not only must the specification enable others
practicing the invention to have a reasonable expectation of success, but
this same reasonable expectation of success must not derive from the
prior art. If the prior art is found to enable the invention, then the patent
application is rejected for nonobviousness. Thus, further developments
100.

In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
101. Id.
102. Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File:Is American Adoption of the InternationalStandardin
PatentLaw Worth the Price?; 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193, 202 (1990).
103. The Paris Convention permits residents and nationals of member countries to claim the
priority right of a previous filing date in another member country for patent applications filed within
12 months of the first filing. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20,
1883, art. 4, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1631-32 (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967).
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in the art of recombinant viral vaccines could have rendered Wright's
invention obvious and, therefore, unpatentable.
Because Wright also does not provide a clear and reasonable basis for
finding the intermediate claims non-enabled, it sends a confusing
message to biotechnology inventors and their attorneys. The rejection of
Wright's intermediate claims suggests that the unpredictability of
biological systems may be so great that claims to biotechnology
inventions are not enabled unless each conceivable embodiment of the
claims has been reduced to actual practice. Such a rule would render
patent protection worthless for biotechnological inventions. Competitors
could easily practice around a patented process by applying the method
to another species, or by making minor modifications to the process.
While such a restrictive policy was not explicit in Wright, and would be
inconsistent with legal precedent,"' the ambiguity remains.
A
clarification of the standards of enablement, particul.arly as they apply to
biotechnology, is therefore needed.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATION OF ENA3LING
DISCLOSURE
In order to provide clarity and consistency, the PTO should refrain
from policy-based decisions, and follow established precedents. When
the PTO does make policy-based decisions, the policy should be explicit
so that applicants may address the policy concerns. Concern for
commensurability of the scope of enablement with the scope of claims
can guide application of the enablement standard, and yield patent
protection proportionate to the value of the inventor's contribution. This
and other valid concerns can be addressed through application of the
Forman factors, thereby incorporating policy concerns while adhering to
precedent. An evaluation of Wright's patent application under this
approach would support the rejection of the broader claims, but lead to
allowance of the intermediate claims.
Consistency and clarity of the law are important when patent
protection is concerned. °5 Cooperative inventors deserve to know what
is expected in a specification's disclosure so they can address these
104. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991); see also cases cited supra note 94.
105. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (referring to consistent application of the docirine of equivalents: "If courts
are not to hinder the progress of technological advance, certainty and predictability are as important
in the application of equitable as of legal principles.").
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expectations in their patent applications. Those who invest in developing
and marketing new inventions, especially in biotechnology, make
decisions of great financial importance based on the expected
patentability of an invention.1 6 If the requirements for patentability
change or remain nebulous, investors may find the risk of losing patent
rights unacceptably high.0 7 The purpose of the patent system, to
promote progress in the useful arts, is lost if progress is hindered by
uncertainty of legal protection for inventions.'0 8
Clarity and consistency require the PTO and the courts to base claim
rejections on sound reasoning. If a claim is considered non-enabled due
to unpredictability of the art, there must be a causal link between that
aspect of the art that is unpredictable and the non-enabled aspect of the
claim. In Wright, the court pointed to variability of immunologic
responses between chicken breeds to show that application of Wright's
vaccine strategy to other viruses was not enabled. This logical fallacy
confuses the enablement standard.
A general theme of the enablement requirement is that the enablement
must correspond in scope to the claims.0 9 This does not mean that the
disclosure must describe every embodiment covered by the claims." 0 In
some instances, it is sufficient that the specification discloses an
inventive concept."' In the less predictable arts, however, the adequacy
of disclosure should be addressed through analysis of the Forman
factors. Valid policy concerns can be accommodated by this approach.
One valid concern is proportionately rewarding useful technological
contributions. A realistically proportionate reward takes into account the
consequences of restricting claim scope. If the patent application
concerns a pioneering invention, the inventor may be more deserving of
broad claims yet be less able to be specific about various embodiments of
the invention.
When a significant contribution deserves broad
protection, a relatively limited disclosure may be regarded as enabling."'
106. Eugene L. Bernard, GovernmentPatentPolicy, 3 Int'l Conf. on Genetic Engineering 8, 9-11
(Melissa Keenberg ed., 1981).
107. See Marchese, supra note 7, at 619-25 (discussing increased transaction costs and
disincentive to invent created by uncertainty in patent disclosure requirements).
108. Reid G. Adler, Biotechnology as an IntellectualProperty,224 Science 357,361 (1984).
109. See Thomas L. Irving et al., The SignificantFederalCircuit CasesInterpretingSection 112,
41 Am. U. L. Rev. 621,637-46 (1992).
110. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
111. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 33, at 846.
112. Winner, supranote 19, at 610.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 69:455, 1994

Conversely, if an inventor has simply taken the next logical step based
on a large body of established background information developed by the
scientific community, broad claims may not be justified.1 Under these
circumstances, the greater foundation of background information should
make it possible for the inventor to provide guidance enabling each
embodiment of the claimed invention. Most cases, however, fall
between these two extremes, and restriction to the narrowest claims
would leave an inventor without meaningful protection despite the value
of the inventor's contribution to progress in the art. While it is true that
basic science research provides much of the background information
necessary to the development of biotechnology products, the work of
basic scientists falls far short of bringing useful products to the public.
Basic scientists, by definition, seek an understanding of the
fundamentals, not of practical applications.
Ir biotechnology, a
considerable amount of research and development :.s necessary to turn
the fruits of basic research into useful products. The recommendations
of Merges and Nelson raise valid arguments for narrow patent protection,
but only in limited situations.
A second valid concern is preventing broad claims from hindering
further advances in the art. The Wright court appeared to be influenced
by such a policy when it pointed out that Wright's broad claims would
include an AIDS vaccine.' 14 The court noted the scientific community's
inability to develop an AIDS vaccine despite all the time, resources, and
scientists devoted to that effort."' The implication was that permitting
Wright's broad claims would discourage development of a much-needed
16
AIDS vaccine because use of it would infringe Wright's patent.'
When the examiners and the courts are concerned that allowing claims
would hinder further advances in an art, explicit statements to that effect
would clarify the hazy line between enablement and non-enablement.
When the PTO rejects a claim for lack of enablement, the basis for that
rejection must be clear so that the patent applicant has the opportunity to
offer appropriate evidence to overcome the rejection. For example, if an
examiner purports to reject a claim for non-enablement because of
variability among species, when in fact the rejection is influenced by a
concern about hindering further advances, the applicant may not have a

113. Merges & Nelson, supranote 33, at 884.
114. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
115. Id. at 1563.
116. Such an infringement could be defended under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.
Donald S. Chisum, 4 Patents § 18.04[4] (1992).

See
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fair opportunity to rebut the examiner's rejection. No amount of
evidence may be found sufficient to rebut the PTO's rejection because
the applicant has not addressed the PTO's true concern. When a PTO
rejection for non-enablement is based on policy grounds, that basis must
be explicit so that the applicant may rebut with evidence that the policy
is not violated.
In summary, policy concerns are best accommodated by: 1) explicitly
acknowledging policy as it influences patent decisions by the PTO and
courts, 2) confining policy factors to those related to the purposes of the
patent system (incentive to disclose inventions and promote progress),
and 3) using a Forman factors analysis to ensure commensurability of
scope of protection with scope of enablement. This does not require
changing existing law, but merely calls for consistency with established
precedents and the objectives of the patent system. In this way, existing
patent law can accommodate the need of biotechnology companies for
patent protection broad enough to make research and development
economically viable.
V.

CONCLUSION

Biotechnology companies require enough breadth in their patent
claims to make investment in technology and patent protection
worthwhile. The court set a confusing and unwarranted precedent when
it upheld the rejection of Wright's claims to recombinant vaccines
against avian tumor viruses. The rejection relied upon a misapplication
of In re Hogan and faulty reasoning to conclude that avian tumor viruses
are too unpredictable to permit claims not fully supported by working
examples. The uncertainty regarding adequate enabling disclosure in
biotechnology patents can be cleared by explicit acknowledgment of any
policy concerns influencing the PTO, and by consistent application of
existing law. To ensure commensurability between the scope of
enablement and the scope of patent claims, the PTO should consider the
value of allowed claims relative to the value of the inventor's disclosure.
The PTO must strike a balance between providing meaningful patent
protection for needed biotechnological inventions and encouraging
subsequent advancement of the technology.

